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Safe Human-Robot Interaction in Medical Robotics: A case study on Robotic Fracture 
Surgery System 
Ioannis Georgilas, Giulio Dagnino, and Sanja Dogramadzi 
Bristol Robotics Laboratory, University of the West of England and University of Bristol, Bristol, BS161QY, United Kingdom 
E-mail: ioannis.georgilas@uwe.ac.uk 
This paper presents a safety analysis of a Robotic Fracture Surgery System using the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). It focuses 
particularly on hazards caused by the human in the loop. The robotic system and operating staff are modelled including information flow between 
different components of the system.   The analysis has generated a set of requirements for the system design that can ultimately mitigate the 
identified hazards, as well as a preliminary set of human-factors that can improve safety. 
Keywords: Safety, Medical Robotics, Surgical Robotics, human-robot interaction 
1.   Introduction 
Safety in close human-robot interactions has been a topic of 
many recent research projects. Use of medical robots in 
operating theatres brings up concerns on every system level – 
individual components, system and human-robot interaction.  
Even though medical robots can potentially provide significant 
benefits to patients, their operation can be significantly more 
harmful if not safely utilized.  
A recent report by Alemzadeh et al on a 13-year-long study of 
Da Vinci system’s FDA data [1] assesses safety of Da Vinci 
system based on the recorded faults  that include 4,798 adverse 
events (involving 86 deaths, 410 patient injuries, and 3405 
device malfunctions). A thorough data processing shown that 
the reported accidents occur due to the ‘inadequacy of safety 
controls and comprehensive warnings to the surgeon, limited 
safety and training practices, lack of certification, and limited 
surgical experience’. A similar study, conducted on computer-
based medical devices, reports the device software as the major 
cause for recalls (64%) followed by hardware and I/O module 
failures. The same study emphasises the importance of design 
with well-defined safety requirements and robust error-
detection methods.  
In medical robotics (MR), the surgeon and clinical staff are often 
required to interact with the system that can have a wide range 
of engineering complexities and requirements for the human 
input. Human-robot interaction plays an important role in 
surgical safety and has been largely ignored in safety analysis of 
medical robots. Effects that human cognitive and emotional 
state can have on tasks jointly performed with a robot has 
already been reported for a search and rescue scenario [2]. It can 
be argued that surgical environment can be sufficiently similar, 
putting operating theatre staff under strain while requiring 
interaction and operation of a complex medical robot.  
1.1.  RAFS project 
Bristol Robotics Laboratory has developed a new robot-assisted 
system for minimally invasive treatment of joint fractures - 
Robot Assisted Fracture Surgery (RAFS) system [3], [4]. 
RAFS aim is the anatomical reduction of intra-articular fractures 
with pre-surgical planning carried out by the orthopaedic 
surgeon. The robotic system and the surgeon have to undertake 
a series of safety-critical actions that are part of a fracture 
management surgical flow. This imposes two safety-critical 
objectives of the system in order to achieve an accurate 
anatomical reduction of the fracture –  
•   Virtual reduction in the pre-planning stage by the 
surgeon and  
•   Intra-operative physical reduction performed by the 
robotic system; 
1.2.  Safety Analysis 
With intensive research and widespread commercial presence of 
medical robots, safety concerns are becoming increasingly 
important to resolve.  
Several safety frameworks have been so far proposed in 
literature to tackle potential hazards imposed by complex 
medical robotics systems [5]–[7]. A recent example is based on 
the component based software engineering [8]–[10] that 
decomposes MR safety features into a run-time software 
platform. The platform monitors the components of the system 
and is intended to be reusable and deployable to any MR system. 
This concept is based on the run-time software architecture that 
is reconfigurable and middleware independent. However, this 
layered architecture and its safety libraries do not include 
human-generated errors.  In a demanding and stressful surgical 
environment, this kind of errors typically occurs in human-robot 
and human-computer interactions. 
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With the current work we are investigating interactions and how 
they are affecting the safety of the system. Specifically, we are 
investigating a new methodology for identifying dangerous 
situations and design appropriate safety measures. This 
document is structured in the following way. In section 2 a 
description for safety analysis approaches is given, and the steps 
for the implementation of STPA is described. In section 3, the 
RAFS system, its individual parts, and the clinical workflow are 
presented. In section 4 the implementation of STPA for the 
RAFS system is performed. Finally, in section 5 the results from 
the safety analysis are reported and an investigation on how the 
results can be utilised to improve the safety of the system done. 
2.   Safety Analysis Methods 
The existing risk analysis tools - Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), HAzard 
and OPerability study (HAZOP) have been developed in the last 
50 years for standard engineering systems with components that 
required relatively basic interaction with the user. These tools 
are effective in identifying direct relationships between causes 
and faults but often-indirect dependencies may not be easily 
recognized. Moreover, independence may be assumed to exist 
when it does not. 
Most commonly utilised risk-assessment tools are approaching 
complex issues as chains-of-failure-events with a prevalent 
method of prevention being safeguarding against cascading 
failure from one component to the next. This is typically 
achieved by monitoring a component of the system, detecting its 
failure, reacting on it, and recovering before it propagates to the 
next level. For most electromechanical parts the two first steps 
of this process are relying on the component reliability that can 
be exhaustively tested, and a probabilistic assessment of the risk 
they pose.  Robotic technologies are based on increasingly 
complex system designs that no longer can be exhaustively 
tested using the current methods applied to complex systems 
such as the ones in e.g. aerospace industry. Utilization of robots 
in dynamic human environments poses new problems and this 
type of risk-assessment oversimplifies user behaviour e.g. if 
he/she gives a correct/incorrect command. This does not 
consider the fact that the modern system decision-making 
required by users can be a complex cognitive task. User-
generated faults cannot be assessed in isolation but instead 
considered within the specific context of the system. 
A preliminary hazard analysis of RAFS system has been 
performed for a range of user-system interactions. We used 
Universal Modelling Language (UML) and codification defined 
in a Hazard-Effect Table. In order to elaborate the importance 
of hazard identification we focused on two specific examples, 
one from the pre-operative planning and one from intra-
operative interactions. For the former we selected the virtual 
reduction scenario and analysed that virtually negligible errors 
in the interaction can become serious problems further down the 
process [11].  
This work has been expanded to obtain a deeper understanding 
of interactions and causalities that can impede on the system 
safety.  
2.1.  STPA Analysis 
STPA [12] or Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis is a hazard 
analysis technique used to identify potential hazard scenarios 
and mitigation methods to prevent accidents and failures. STPA 
is derived from system theory unlike most other hazard analysis 
tools that are derived from reliability theory. This system 
approach allows a wider overview of the process in question, 
and a hierarchically structured analysis that has already been 
explored for domestic robot hazard analysis [13] and medical 
applications [14]. 
Another benefit of the STPA analysis is the ability to take into 
consideration models of each ‘actor’ in the system operation. 
Actor models in this context are part of the structure and state of 
the system’s control architecture. The term actor could refer to 
e.g humans-in-the-loop or the robot controller. 
In order to use the STPA approach to analyse hazards of a 
system, a sequence of steps [15] must be utilized to facilitate the 
analysis, namely:  
(i)   Establish the system’s Hierarchical Control Model (HCM) 
and Process Model (PM). In this step the hierarchy of the 
control elements of the system is developed, moreover, the 
interconnection of the elements and the signals exchanged 
as part of the process are identified; 
(ii)   Identify potentially Unsafe Control Actions (UCA). In this 
step, an analysis of the effects of a control action, and the 
safety implication within specific context is performed; 
(iii)  Use UCAs to derive safety requirements and constraints 
(SR&C). In this step, the context conditions upon which a 
UCA can materialise are translated into constrains for the 
control system and requirements of the design. 
 
The humans-in-the-loop have a cognitive model based on their 
role in the system operation. The robot controller also has a 
model of the system’s control process and the relevant sensory 
information. All actors issue control and setup commands based 
on these models. Any discrepancies between reality and model 
might lead to hazardous situations. In other words, a safe control 
state might become an unsafe due to the conflicting control 
messages being sent to the system and the context in which these 
messages are issued.  
This holistic approach of STPA makes it ideal for systems where 
users’ input holds significant weight on the overall safety of the 
system. We have implemented this approach to the RAFS 
system where complex interactions are directly affecting the 
performance and quality of surgical outcomes. The work 
presented here is a system-level analysis of the human-in-the-
loop related risks related to medical/surgical robots. The main 
assumption is that the individual component level risks are 
known and the focus is on analysis of the complex control 
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interactions between the actors involved in surgical tasks. The 
tasks presented in this paper are workflow steps of robot-
assisted fracture surgeries but can be translated to other similar 
procedures.  As stated in [15] “The goal is not to find just 
failures or inadequate operation of individual components in the 
control loop, but to identify scenarios and combinations of 
problems that could lead to unsafe control.” 
 
 
Fig.1 – The RAFS system prototype  
 
3.   RAFS System Description  
The RAFS system has been developed at Bristol Robotics 
Laboratory. The RAFS system is shown in Fig. 1. Its subsystems 
are: 
Robotic Fracture Manipulator (RFM) introduced in [16], is 
designed to be connected to the bone fragment through an 
orthopaedic pin for fragment manipulation. It is based on a 
parallel-robot configuration with 6-DOF and has 6 motorized 
linear actuators fully computer-controlled.  RFM’s positioning 
accuracy is (±10.25mm along x, y, ±15mm along z and rotational 
limits of ±17° around each axis). Its overall translational 
accuracy is 0.03±0.01mm and rotational accuracy is 0.12±0.01° 
[17]. A 6-DOF force-torque load cell attached to RFM enables 
force control. In order to fully cover the required operational 
workspace (see [17]), the robotic manipulator is mounted on a 
carrier platform. 
Carrier Platform (CP) is used for a coarse positioning of the 
RFM (which is rigidly connected) close to the orthopaedic pin. 
, The RFM is then used to accurately manipulate the fragment 
to the desired pose. The CP has 4-DOF, two prismatic and two 
revolute (see Fig.4a), and a cylindrical workspace (700mm 
length, 300mm diameter), covering the required operational 
workspace described in [17]. The CP has 4 motorized actuators, 
one for each DOF, and it is fully computer-controlled. 
System Workstation employs a host-target structure composed 
by a PC (host) and a real-time controller with FPGA (target), 
and a low-level motor controller. The host PC runs the Graphical 
User Interface (GUI) and the Configuration Interface (CI). It 
creates the link between the surgical team and the robotic 
system. The GUI allows the surgeon to interact with the virtual 
surgical field (3D Imaging System) while the CI is used for 
system configuration and safety alarm messages. The host PC 
communicates with the target controller via Ethernet. The target 
controller (NI-compactRIO 9068, National Instruments) process 
users’ commands and sends the motion commands to the low 
level motor controller (EPOS 2 24/3, Maxon Motor) that 
executes the movement of the robotic system. 
3D Imaging System, introduced in [18], [19], consists of a 
reduction software, an optical tracking system, and a user 
controller. The reduction software receives pre-operative CT 
scan data of the fracture and generates corresponding 3D models 
of the bone fragments. The GUI displays the 3D models and 
facilitates intra-operative planning of fracture reduction, i.e. 
virtual reduction. Collision avoidance is enabled to avoid 
overlap of the 3D models. The optical tracking system (Polaris 
Spectra, NDI Inc.) provides real-time (25Hz) update of optical 
tools (0.25mm accuracy) connected to the bone fragments and 
the RFM. 
In Fig. 2, the interaction diagram between the subsystems and 
the human actors is given. The four subsystems are depicted - 
the vision tracker, the console PC, the system controller and the 
robot in the surgical field. The human actors are also presented, 
with the interactions of the surgeon and the system components. 
For clarity, the actual interactions of the operating theatre (OR) 
staff have been omitted, but this will be analysed later in the 
document. 
3.1.  Workflow 
Every medical procedure must have a specific workflow that has 
been scrutinized in terms of its safety. While developing the 
RAFS system, special effort was made to keep the workflow 
similar to the current practice and reuse the workflow elements 
(e.g. placement of manipulation pins). Fig. 3 shows the current 
surgical workflow of a distal femoral fracture that has been 
created after discussions with surgeons and evaluated and 
amended through laboratory experiments. 
From Figs. 2 and 3, it is clear that the surgeon is a critical part 
of the control loop. He/she is providing the expert knowledge 
and instructs the robotic system to perform the operation; during 
the pre-operative phase by performing the virtual reduction, and 
intra-operatively by inserting the pins, supervising and 
continually assessing the procedure. The surgeon is also 
responsible for activating the emergency system when the 
procedure deviates from the pre-planned parameters. Also, the 
OR staff are performing tasks related to and close to the system 
such as positioning the tracker, cleaning tools for better 
visibility, and checking patient and equipment status. All actions 
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of the surgeon and staff are performed based on real time 
situational awareness, clinical experience, and their cognitive 
and emotional status. 
4.   STPA for RAFS 
The steps, defined in Section 2.1, are applied to setup an STPA 
analytical process. First, a model of control interactions between 
the human operators and the robotic system is developed, then 
control actions of both the human and the robot are identified, 
and, finally, constraints and requirements to be implemented in 
the robot and the surgical workflow are defined.  
The STPA definitions [15] for accidents and hazards are:  
Definition 1. “An accident is an undesired and unplanned event 
that results in a loss, including loss of human life or human 
injury, property damage, environmental pollution, mission loss, 
financial loss, etc.”  
Definition 2. “A hazard is a system state or set of conditions that 
together with a worst-case set of environmental conditions, will 
lead to an accident (loss).” 
Based on these definitions, and clinical analysis of the 
workflow, the following major potential accidents, and their 
respective types of consequences are: 
AC1   Person Injury (Patient or OR staff); 
AC2   Inaccurate Reduction – Mission Failure; 
AC3   Tissue Damage – Mission Failure. 
The hazards that can cause these accidents are the following: 
HA1   Uncontrolled motion of the System; 
HA2   Incorrect motion of the System; 
HA3   Incorrect setup of the System. 
The first hazard can be further analysed into more specific ones, 
like uncontrolled motion of the system when attached to the 
fragment and/or when moving to reach the fragment’s final 
position. 
From this analysis we can further refine high-level requirements 
identified for RAFS in section 1: 
•   Must accurately reduce an intra-articular fracture; 
•   Must not move in an unintended way; 
•   Must not lose position and force feedback. 
Table I – Table of Hazards and Corresponding Accidents	  
Hazards Uncontrolled motion of  the System when …  
Incorrect 
motion  
Incorrect 
Setup  
Accidents 
… attached to 
fragment 
… moving to  
new position. 
 
Human 
Injury x x x x 
Inaccurate 
Reduction x  x x 
 
 Fig. 2 – Interactions between the subsystems (Vision tracker, Console PC, 
System Controller, Robot) and human actors (Patient, Surgeon, OR Staff). 
 
 Fig. 3 – RAFS Clinical Workflow. The process is separated into Pre-
operative and Intra-operative states.  
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Soft 
Tissue 
Damage 
x  x x 
The next step of the STPA analysis is to map the control 
structure of RAFS into the HCM and PM. Based on this and the 
process model that each member of the hierarchy is represented 
by, a list of potentially unsafe control actions will be derived. 
4.1.  Hierarchical Control Model (HCM) and Process 
Model (PM) 
The RAFS system is a set of sub-systems and interactions, as 
shown in Fig. 4. The RAFS’s HCM is represented by three basic 
elements   and command and information signals exchanged in 
the system. 
 
Fig. 4. – Top-level Hierarchical Control Model of RAFS. The three main 
elements and the types of the exchanged information are presented. 
Figure 5 shows a detailed information flow between OR Staff 
and the Treatment Delivery System and the Treatment Delivery 
System and the Patient. Both Figs 5a and 5b are focused on the 
intra-operative phase. Three types of information signals are 
defined: 
•   Command Actions – bold text in Fig. 5; 
•   Setup Actions – plain text in Fig. 5; 
•   Feedback information – italic text in Fig. 5.  
Notably, the control actions are divided into two major groups, 
setup and command, having roughly equal importance for the 
safe operation of the system.  
An important aspect of the STPA is an accurate process model 
of each actor in the system. Discrepancies between the model 
and the reality are typically leading to hazardous situations. The 
process models in the RAFS system are presented in Fig. 6. 
 
 
(a) Control model for OR staff 
 
(b) Control model for Treatment Delivery System and Patient 
Fig. 5. – Detailed views of the Hierarchical Control Model. Command 
signals are in bold, setup signals in plain, and information in italic. The 
position information from Pin to Visual Tracker (subfigure b) is indirect. 
The OR staff has two models, a model of the clinical procedure 
and a model of the treatment delivery system. The former is 
associated with the surgeon’s and the OR staff’s cognitive 
model of the procedure based on their experience and hospital 
procedures. These models include setup characteristics and 
anticipated behaviour based on training on the system and 
familiarity with its operation. 
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Fig. 6. – Process Models for the Sub-Systems of RAFS 
After the HCM and the PM of the system have been established 
the next step for the implementation of STPA is to find the 
Unsafe Control Actions (UCA). The UCAs are usually 
generated by the HCM and must be tracked back in the PM. 
4.2.   Identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) in RAFS 
Based on the HCM (Fig. 5) presented above we define the 
Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) for the system. In this work we 
are going to extend the definition of UCA to include setup 
actions. As explained above, the reason for this is that the setup 
actions are crucial for the system safety. A table representation 
of the UCAs includes not only the hazards associated with UCA, 
but also wrong timing and out-of-sequence control actions (CA) 
as too early or late use of the CAs. The UCAs for RAFS are 
given in Table II. The CAs and hazard situations depend on the 
time of issuing the command. If a hazard does not occur under 
any circumstances, then the action is safe in the given time 
condition. 
For some UCAs the context of the action is also required in 
order to confirm if a hazard is probable. One example of this is 
CA2-Stop Treatment. When issued too early, it can cause the 
robot not to complete the bone reduction. This depends on the 
current state of the system, which the actor has to evaluate based 
on his/her observation of the surgical state. An STPA tool to 
analyse possible system states is the use of context tables. In 
these, the state of the system is correlated with the process 
parameters to establish if an action is hazardous in a given 
context or not.  Table III provides this information for the UCA 
specified in Table II. Setup Actions are omitted because these 
are affecting the state of the system and also the state of the 
process models.   
In the following section we are going to investigate the impact 
of setup actions to the process models and corresponding 
hazards. 
4.3.  The effects of setup actions 
The setup actions are affecting directly the state of the process 
model both for the OR stuff and for the TDS. As can be seen in 
Table II, all the time critical criteria for a hazard are related to 
the pin, bone or visual feedback position. The potential 
compromise each Setup action (SCA) can have to a process 
model parameter (from Fig. 6) leading to one or more potential 
hazards is given by the following statements: 
Position Patient compromises Bone Position/Tracker Location 
leading to hazards HA2/HA3. 
Position Pin compromises Pin Location/Tracker 
Location/Bone Location leading to hazards HA1/HA2/HA3. 
Position Tool compromises Tracker Location/Bone Location 
leading to hazard HA2. 
Move in the OR compromises Tracker Location leading to 
hazard HA2. 
Move Polaris compromises Tracker Location leading to 
hazards HA3/HA2. 
Attach Pin to Robot compromises Bone Location/Force 
Applied leading to hazard HA2 
The next step after establishing the context of the control action 
is to investigate control scenarios that involve those actions. 
Based on these scenarios, a set of requirements for the system 
design can be derived. 
5.   Discussion 
From the analysis presented in the previous section, 
requirements and constraints for the system that should 
minimise the identified hazards and thus accidents can be 
derived. The requirements and constraints will depend on the 
type of the action, setup or control. The requirements will ensure 
that the context for a given control action is appropriate,  but a 
more complex checking mechanism must be in place to confirm 
the state of the process model and ensure that model parameters 
and the real-time values are synchronised at all times. 
5.1.  Requirements and Constrains from UCAs 
Scenarios for the issuing of control actions are derived from 
Table III. As we note from the table, the most crucial process 
parameter is the state of Emergency.  
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CA2 Case 1 – The ‘stop treatment’ command must not be issued 
late in the state of emergency to avoid human injury (OR staff 
or patient). This can be achieved by providing the TDS with 
emergency parameter information, and ensuring that the 
operating surgeon has a clear indication of the emergency state. 
CA2 Case 2 – The stop treatment command is issued at the 
appropriate time when the force is excessive. Too early or too 
late issuing will result in inaccurate reduction or soft tissue 
damage. This can be achieved by allowing appropriate force 
limit thresholds and time of reaction, i.e. not an absolute cut-out 
value but gradient force information.  An appropriate 
representation of force information should be available to the 
surgeon. 
CA2 Case 3 – The stop treatment command is issued when the 
bone position is not correct, resulting in inaccurate reduction. 
This can be prevented by clearly indicating that the reduction is 
not complete and the user interface restricts the issue of this 
command. 
CA2 Case 4 – The stop treatment command is issued when the 
robot is in an incorrect position, having a mechanical fault, but 
the reduction process is correct (bone is in a correct position). 
This can lead to a patient injury if the command is issued too 
late. An amendment action to prevent this hazard would be that 
the system continuously evaluates the progress of the treatment 
in terms of the bone location and stops any other movements. 
CA3 Case 1 – The manual override command is issued at the 
state of emergency. This might lead to patient’s injury. There 
are two requirements/constraints that can amend this scenario; 
firstly the process model of the TDS must be aware of the 
emergency state, as in CA2 Case 1, so as to ignore the manual 
override, secondly, there must be a clear indication of this 
emergency state to the operating surgeon issued by the TDS. 
CA3 Case 2 – The manual override command is issued when an 
excessive force is applied by the system. This might happen 
when the system stopped the motion due to reaching the force 
limits. The user creates this action. This case can be amended by 
explicitly denying the motion if the force constraints are not 
reached and informing the user that this is the case.  
CA3 Case 3 – The manual override command is issued when the 
bone is in the correct position. A potential hazard could be 
inaccurate reduction. A requirement to amend this is to prevent 
issuing commands when the reduction is completed.   
TA2/5 Case 1 – The TDS issues a start trajectory/motion 
command when the system is in the emergency state, leading to 
patient’s injury. The potential amendment of this case is similar 
to CA3 Case 1 -the TDS process model is aware of the 
emergency state of the system. 
TA2/5 Case 2 – The TDS issues a start trajectory/motion 
command when the system is in Setup state and the OR staff is 
executing setup actions. This will lead to two potential 
accidents; firstly the OR staff might get injured, secondly the 
process model is compromised since the movement is affecting 
the setup process, leading to inaccurate reduction. The safety 
constraint for this can be to prevent any movement command 
while in the setup mode. 
TA2/5 Case 3 – The TDS issues a start trajectory/motion 
command when excessive force is applied, leading to soft tissue 
damage. The requirement in this case is using  force threshold 
as a watchdog and preventing any motion when force limits are 
exceeded. 
TA2/5 Case 4 – The TDS issues a start trajectory/motion 
command when the bone is reduced but there is a potentially 
incorrect position of the robot. This is similar to CA3 Case 3 and 
has the same requirement where the system is to stop issuing 
commands when the reduction is completed.  
TA3/6 Case 1 – The TDS issues a stop trajectory/motion 
command late when in an emergency situation. Similarly, to 
other cases (CA2 Case 1), the system should be able to recognise 
the emergency status and handle stop commands accordingly. 
TA3/6 Case 2 – The TDS issues a stop trajectory/motion 
command when the force is excessive. This case is similar to 
CA2 Case 2 and the same constrains/requirements apply. i.e. the 
gradient force information, including appropriate representation 
of force information to surgeon. 
TA3/6 Case 3 – The TDS issues a stop trajectory/motion 
command when the bone is in an incorrect position and the robot 
is in the correct position. This might lead to inaccurate 
reduction.  This can be amended by providing relevant 
information through the GUI to the user to authorise such a 
command. 
TA3/6 Case 4 - The TDS issues a stop trajectory/motion 
command late and when the robot is in an incorrect position. 
This might be due to hardware failure and can lead to patient’s 
injury. The TDS should be aware of such situations and 
promptly issue stop commands. The requirement is that the 
process control model must be extended to include such cases. 
Table IV summarises the requirements and constraints. The 
requirements not included in the Table IV are related to the 
human factors and will be discussed separately in this section. 
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Table II – Unsafe Control Actions for RAFS. Setup and Control Actions of the Surgeon,  
and Control actions of the Treatment Delivery System (TDS). 
Un-Controlled 
Action 
Not providing 
causes hazard 
Providing 
causes hazard 
Early/late 
out-of-sequence 
causes hazard 
Stopping too soon/ 
applying too long 
causes hazard 
Setup Action (SCA)         
1. Position Patient  NA Patient’s leg in a difficult 
configuration causing 
inaccurate reduction. 
NA NA 
2. Position Pin NA Pin-Bone relative position 
information is incorrect 
If happens after 2D to 3D 
registration, alters the 3D 
model of the bones 
NA 
3. Position Tool NA Pin-Bone relative position 
information is incorrect 
If happens after 2D to 3D 
registration alters the 3D 
model of the bones 
NA 
4. Move in the OR NA Robot collides with OR staff NA NA 
5. Move Polaris Optical tools get out of view Optical tools get out of the 
view 
Optical tools get out of the 
view 
NA 
6. Attach Pin to 
Robot 
Inaccurate reduction  Compromised Pin-Bone 
Relative Position 
NA 
Control Action (CA)         
1. Start Treatment NA NA The setup might be 
incomplete, or the robot is not 
ready 
NA 
2. Stop Treatment The Robot moves out-of-
control or in an incorrect way 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
NA 
3. Manual Override The Robot moves in an 
incorrect way 
The commands are not 
providing bone reduction  
The system has not reduced 
the fracture 
The system has not 
reduced the fracture 
TDS Actions (TA)         
1. Set Target Position NA The values are wrong and the  
robot will move in an 
incorrect way 
If late it will cause the robot 
to move in an uncontrolled 
way 
NA 
2. Start Trajectory NA The system is not ready The setup might not be 
complete, or the robot is not 
ready 
NA 
3. Stop Trajectory 
 
The Robot moves out-of-
control or in an incorrect way 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
NA 
4. Set Motor Target NA The values are wrong and the  
robot will move in an 
incorrect way 
If late then will cause the 
robot to move in an 
uncontrolled way 
NA 
5. Start Motion NA The setup is incorrect The setup might be 
incomplete, or the robot is not 
ready 
NA 
6. Stop Motion The Robot moves out-of-
control or in an incorrect way 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
NA 
7. Force-limit Stop The robot causes tissue 
damage 
The robot has not completed 
the bone reduction 
If early, the system has not 
completed the bone reduction. 
If too late, the robot causes 
tissue damage 
NA 
Note: Text in Italics indicates that the context affects the existence of hazard.. 
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Table III – Context table for Unsafe Control Actions of the OR Staff and TDS. Accidents caused depending on the context of the control 
action. 
Action 
Emergency 
status 
Robot 
State 
Force 
Applied 
Bone 
Position 
Robot 
Position 
If provided… …in this context 
… any time … 
… too early 
… 
… too late … 
C
A
2 
– 
St
op
 T
re
at
m
en
t 
Emergency (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No Yes (AC1) 
No Emergency Idle (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Setup (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Treatment Excessive (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No Yes (AC2) Yes (AC3) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Incorrect (d.n.m.) No No Yes (AC2) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct Incorrect No No Yes (AC1) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct Correct No No No 
C
A
3 
– 
M
an
ua
l O
ve
rr
id
e Emergency (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) Yes (AC1) - - 
No Emergency Idle (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Setup (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Treatment Excessive (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No Yes (AC2) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Incorrect (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct (d.n.m) Yes (AC2)  -   -  
TA
2/
5 
- S
ta
rt 
 
Tr
aj
ec
to
ry
/M
ot
io
n 
Emergency (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No Yes (AC1) 
No Emergency Idle (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Setup (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) Yes(AC1&AC2)  -   -  
No Emergency Treatment Excessive (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) Yes (AC3)  -   -  
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Incorrect (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct Incorrect Yes (AC2)  -   -  
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct Correct No No No 
TA
3/
6 
- S
to
p 
 
Tr
aj
ec
to
ry
/M
ot
io
n 
Emergency (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No Yes (AC1) 
No Emergency Idle (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Setup (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
No Emergency Treatment Excessive (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No Yes (AC2) Yes (AC3) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Incorrect Correct Yes (AC2) No No 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate (d.n.m.) Incorrect No No Yes (AC1) 
No Emergency Treatment Appropriate Correct Correct No No No 
TA
1/
4 
- S
et
 
Ta
rg
et
\ 
M
ot
or
 (d.n.m.) Idle (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
(d.n.m.) Setup (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) No No No 
(d.n.m.) Treatment (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) (d.n.m.) Yes(AC1&AC2)  -   -  
(d.n.m) : does not matter 
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Table IV – Table of Requirements as generated by the UCA case 
analysis.	  
Req. Number Requirement Description 
R1 
Add emergency parameter to the TDS process 
model as a flag for issuing commands by the 
surgeon and the TDS itself 
R2 
Force hysteresis thresholds, i.e. triggering and 
releasing alerts at different force limits. Adding 
exceptions in manual override cases. 
R3 Control of the stop treatment command based on TDS process model. 
R4 System movement is assessed in terms of the bone position and not robot’s end-effector position 
R5 No further motion commands are issued if the reduction is complete. 
R6 Clear setup mode and no movement commands in this mode. 
R7 
General reliability requirements for ensuring that 
process parameters of the TDS model are accurately 
reflecting robot’s status. 
 
Three major types of requirements can be seen in Table IV a) 
process model amendments (R1), b) use of process model 
parameters for contextualising commands (R3, R5, R6), and c) 
operational amendments (R2, R4) and overall hardware 
functionality (R7). The first type is intended to improve the 
process models and make it more comprehensive in order to 
cover all possible situations. The second type is intended to 
allow a contextualisation of decision-making. It is attempting to 
evaluate the state of the system and provide an informed 
decision for the next action. The third type includes 
requirements that are affecting the type of control. It provides a 
control approach that is using a different metric than a typical 
method, for example, force is not used as a fixed value but as a 
range, and position is controlled indirectly to achieve the 
optimal result. Finally, requirement R7 is intended not only as a 
technical reassurance but also as a mean to verify the process 
model. The latter is crucial for performance of the system.  This 
is why setup actions are important. 
5.2.  Mitigation of hazards from Setup Control Actions 
As seen in section 4.3, the setup actions can be compromising 
process parameters, potentially creating discrepancies between 
the actual state of the system and the model. This could be 
difficult to amend since the criteria of assessing a state are 
compromised. A possible mitigation technic could be to use 
redundancy structures to allow overlap of process model 
parameters. For example, in the case of positioning the system’s 
parts, Pin Position, Bone Position, and Tracker Position can be 
compared to each other, and compared to internal robot 
information (e.g. encoder values). Similarly, force information, 
Force Applied, can be compared with the motor current data, 
and the robot’s dynamics model to verify the state of the 
reduction and the interaction with soft tissues. Moreover, a 
comparison of position information and force information can 
provide an additional cross-referencing layer regarding bone-
pin-robot relationship. Figure 7 gives a pictorial representation 
of this interaction.   
In order to allow a correct interaction, the requirement R7 must 
be satisfied which assumes reliable hardware and the human 
operator’s process model kept properly updated and in sync with 
the process model. This can be achieved by taking into account 
human factors when designing interactions with the system. 
5.3.  Human factors for safety 
Further to the technical requirements presented in section 5.1, it 
is clear that the analysed cases include requirements related to 
the interactions of the user with the system. Human-factors 
related to the use of medical devices have been widely explored 
in the relevant literature, In [20], [21] the authors are exploring 
communication between the user and the system and potential 
consequences. Reviewing the human-factors requirements 
derived from the above cases bring us to the same conclusions:  
•   the operating surgeon should have a clear indication of the 
emergency state; 
•   appropriate representation of force information must be 
available to the surgeon; 
•   alerts that force constraints are not satisfied; 
•   GUI provides information to the user to authorise the stop 
trajectory/motion command. 
All the above requirements provide clear communication of the 
system information. If the information that reaches the operator 
is not adequately clear, his/her knowledge of the process state is 
flawed and out-of-sync with the reality. As a result this 
discrepancy can lead to hazardous situations. 
6.   Conclusions 
We have analysed safe human-robot interaction for a medical 
robotic system that assists the surgeon in reducing fractures. We 
 
Fig. 7. Force and Position information flow validating process 
model parameters  
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are using STPA as a systematic analysis tool of the control 
interactions. The STPA is preferred to the traditional safety 
approaches because it incorporates the concept of the context 
and the process models. We have demonstrated in the specific 
cases that the use of STPA enables the detection of hazardous 
situations when a given command can be unsafe because the 
context is hazardous and not necessarily the command itself. 
Based on these cases, we have derived requirements and 
constraints for the system that were not originally included in its 
control architecture. 
Moreover, through the same cases and with the use of setup 
actions we demonstrated the importance of interactions between 
the user and the system. It has been identified that simple 
technical solutions will not suffice if the human-in-the-loop is 
not aware of the current process state. This also brings forward 
the importance of having up-to-date process models in order to 
allow for correct and safe, control interactions. To strengthen 
this point, a future step for this research will be testing of the 
safety measures in real user-case experiments with the actual 
system. 
Acknowledgment 
This is a summary of independent research funded by the 
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR)'s Invention for 
Innovation (i4i) Programme. The views expressed are those of 
the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or 
the Department of Health. 
References 
[1] H. Alemzadeh, J. Raman, N. Leveson, and R. K. Iyer, 
“Safety Implications of Robotic Surgery: A Study of 13 
Years of FDA Data on da Vinci Surgical Systems,” 
Univ. Illinois Coord. Sci. Lab. Tech. Report, UILU-
ENG-13-2208, 2013. 
[2] M. M. Sobhani, A. G. Pipe, S. Dogramadzi, and J. G. 
Fennell, “Towards Model-Based Robot Behaviour 
Adaptation  : Successful Human-Robot Collaboration in 
Tense and Stressful Situations,” no. 238486. 
[3] D. Raabe, S. Dogramadzi, and R. Atkins, “Semi-
automatic percutaneous reduction of intra-articular joint 
fractures - An initial analysis,” in 2012 IEEE 
International Conference on Robotics and Automation 
(ICRA), 2012, pp. 2679–2684. 
[4] G. Dagnino, I. Georgilas, R. Atkins, S. Dogramadzi, and 
others, “Image-based robotic system for enhanced 
minimally invasive intra-articular fracture surgeries,” in 
2016 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and 
Automation (ICRA), 2016, pp. 696–701. 
[5] A. Sánchez, P. Poignet, E. Dombre, A. Menciassi, and 
P. Dario, “A design framework for surgical robots: 
Example of the Araknes robot controller,” Rob. Auton. 
Syst., vol. 62, no. 9, pp. 1342–1352, 2014. 
[6] L. A. Sanchez, M.-Q. Le, K. Rabenorosoa, C. Liu, N. 
Zemiti, P. Poignet, E. Dombre, A. Menciassi, and P. 
Dario, “A case study of safety in the design of surgical 
robots: The ARAKNES platform,” in Intelligent 
Autonomous Systems 12, Springer, 2013, pp. 121–130. 
[7] J. Guiochet, Q. A. Do Hoang, M. Kaâniche, and D. 
Powell, “Applying Existing Standards to a Medical 
Rehabilitation Robot  : Limits and Challenges,” 
IEEE/RSJ Int. Conf. Intell. Robot. Syst. (IROS), Work. 
FW5 Saf. Human-Robot Coexistence Interact. How can 
Stand. Res. benefit from each other?, p. 5, 2012. 
[8] M. Jung and P. Kazanzides, “Run-time Safety 
Framework for Component-based Medical Robots,” in 
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyper-
Physical System (Workshop of MedicalCyber Physical 
Systems), 2013, pp. 1 – 8. 
[9] M. Y. Jung, R. H. Taylor, and P. Kazanzides, “Safety 
Design View  : A Conceptual Framework for Systematic 
Understanding of Safety Features of Medical Robot 
Systems,” in 2014 IEEE International Conference on 
Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2014, pp. 1883–1888. 
[10] P. Kazanzides, G. Fichtinger, G. D. Hager, A. M. 
Okamura, L. L. Whitcomb, and R. H. Taylor, “Surgical 
and interventional robotics-core concepts, technology, 
and design [Tutorial],” Robot. Autom. Mag. IEEE, vol. 
15, no. 2, pp. 122–130, 2008. 
[11] I. Georgilas, G. Dagnino, and S. Dogramadzi, “Human-
caused hazards in medical robotics: The case of a 
Fracture Reduction System,” in Joint Workshop on New 
Technologies for Computer/Robot Assisted Surgery, 
2015. 
[12] N. Leveson, “Engineering a Safer World,” J. Chem. Inf. 
Model., vol. 53, p. 555, 2011. 
[13] E. Mitka and S. G. Mouroutsos, “Applying the STAMP 
system safety engineering methodology to the design of 
a domestic robot,” Int. J. Appl. Syst. Stud., vol. 6, no. 1, 
pp. 81–102, 2015. 
[14] S. Procter and J. Hatcliff, “Hazard Analysis for Medical 
Applications,” in Formal Methods and Models for 
Codesign (MEMOCODE), 2014 Twelfth ACM/IEEE 
International Conference on, 2014, pp. 124–133. 
[15] N. Leveson, “An STPA Primer,” Version 1, vol. 2013, 
no. August, 2013. 
[16] G. Dagnino, I. Georgilas, P. Tarassoli, R. Atkins, and S. 
Dogramadzi, “Design and Real-Time Control of a 
Robotic System for Fracture Manipulation,” in IEEE 
EMBC 2015, 2015. 
[17] G. Dagnino, I. Georgilas, P. Tarassoli, R. Atkins, and S. 
Dogramadzi, “Vision-Based Real-Time Position 
Control of a Semi-automated System for Robot- 
Assisted Joint Fracture Surgery,” 29th Congr. Comput. 
Assist. Radiol. Surg., 2015. 
[18] G. Dagnino, I. Georgilas, P. Tarassoli, R. Atkins, and S. 
Georgilas, Dagnino, and Dogramadzi 12 
Dogramadzi, “Intra-Operative 3D Imaging System for 
Robot-Assisted Fracture Manipulation,” in 37th Annual 
International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in 
Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC), 2015. 
[19] G. Dagnino, I. Georgilas, P. Köhler, S. Morad, R. 
Atkins, and S. Dogramadzi, “Navigation system for 
robot-assisted intra-articular lower-limb fracture 
surgery,” Int. J. Comput. Assist. Radiol. Surg., pp. 1–13, 
2016. 
[20] C. J. Vincent, Y. Li, and A. Blandford, “Integration of 
human factors and ergonomics during medical device 
design and development: it’s all about 
communication.,” Appl. Ergon., vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 413–
9, May 2014. 
[21] S. Sharples, J. Martin, A. Lang, M. Craven, S. O’Neill, 
and J. Barnett, “Medical device design in context: A 
model of user–device interaction and consequences,” 
Displays, vol. 33, no. 4–5, pp. 221–232, Oct. 2012. 
 
Ioannis Georgilas received his M.S. and 
Ph.D. degrees id Production Engineering 
from Democritus University of Thrace, 
Greece, in 2005 and 2010, respectively. 
From 2011 to 2013, he was a Research 
Associate at the Bristol Robotics 
Laboratory, University of the West of 
England, Bristol, UK. and worked on the 
project of Bio-inspired Unconventional 
Manipulation. From 2013 until 2015, he worked as a Research 
Fellow at Bristol Robotics Laboratory, University of the West 
of England, Bristol, UK, for the project of Robot Assisted 
Fracture Surgery. Since 2015 he is a Lecturer on Mechatronics 
at the University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. 
 
Giulio Dagnino received his M.S. degree 
in Bioengineering from the Universita’ 
degli Studi di Genova, Italy, and his Ph.D. 
degree in Medical Robotics from the 
Universita’ degli Studi di Genova, Italy, in 
2007 and 2013, respectively. From 2010 to 
2013, he was at the Istituto Italiano di 
Tecnologia, as Doctoral Fellow. He is 
currently a Research Fellow at the Bristol Robotics Laboratory, 
University of the West of England, UK, where he is working on 
the NIHR funded project RAFS	   (Robot-Assisted Fracture 
Surgery). His efforts are concentrated on the development of 
real-time control and 3D imaging for the system. 
Sanja Dogramadzi received her Ph.D. 
degree from the University of Newcastle, 
in 2001. From 2001 to 2006 she was a 
Post-Doctoral Researcher/ at the 
University of Leeds working on various 
projects in BioMedical Robotics and 
Safety of Engineering Systems. From 
2006 to 2012, she has been a Senior 
Lecturer in Robotics at University of the West of England. Now, 
she holds the position of Associate Professor of Medical 
Robotics at the Faculty of Engineering at the University of the 
West of England. 
 
